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Abstract 
 
I analyze the impact that large-scale Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) purchases 
carried by the Federal Reserve in response to the financial crisis had in the economy and 
find that they were able to enhance confidence in financial markets and influence MBS 
pricing. Default probabilities of financial companies fell 33 basis points, which can be 
explained by the lower quantity of MBS in their balance sheets and the increased value 
of the MBS remaining in their asset side. The default risk premium of MBS decreased 
66 basis points, which represents 22% of the reduction in MBS yields in the period 
analyzed. 
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I. Introduction 
In this project I analyze the impact that the large-scale Mortgage Backed Securities 
(MBS) purchases, also known as Quantitative Easing, had on the economy. More 
specifically, my objective is to analyze two channels for this impact that are directly 
related to the type of asset purchased by the Federal Reserve. These channels, on which 
I focus my analysis, are the impact of Quantitative Easing on MBS pricing and on the 
capability of Quantitative Easing to restore confidence on financial markets. 
Since confidence in financial markets was low due to the financial crisis, default risk 
of companies operating in this sector increased. The poor quality of some MBS also 
increased concerns over the value of financial companies. Through the purchases of 
MBS, which increased the value of MBS and removed part of the MBS from the asset 
side of the investors, the Federal Reserve reduced default risk of companies operating in 
the financial sector. Following an event study approach, and estimating default 
probabilities for a large sample of companies, I find that Quantitative Easing improved 
conditions in financial markets, decreasing three year default probabilities by 37 bps. 
To study the impact of Quantitative Easing on MBS pricing, I remove the effects of 
variations in prepayment and default risks. The first is analyzed based on Bloomberg 
Mortgage Market insights and default risk is measured with the spread between Fannie 
Mae debt and U.S. Treasury securities. I find that purchases of MBS contribute through 
a default risk premium channel to a reduction of 66 bps in MBS yields. Evidence in 
support of the existence of a prepayment risk premium channel is also found. 
The Work Project is structured as follows: section II states the research that has been 
done to analyze the impacts of MBS purchases; section III presents the methodology 
that I propose to follow; section IV analyzes the data and section V concludes. 
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II. Literature review 
Disruptions in MBS markets contributed to the severity of the financial crisis. On a 
report developed by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), 
high risk mortgage lending is one of the factors causing the crisis. Brunnermeier (2009) 
explains how losses on mortgages markets amplified into the financial crisis, suggesting 
that funding (ability to borrow, using assets as collateral) and market liquidity (ability to 
sell those assets) were worsening, due to loss spirals on MBS portfolios. Brunnermeier 
(2009) further suggests that maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, with 
several banks recurring to short term funding, amplified the negative outcomes of the 
crisis to companies, which were not able to refinance their short-term liabilities. 
In 2008 the Federal Reserve announced it would purchase agency MBS, in order to 
reduce “the cost and increase the availability of credit to the purchase of houses (…) 
and foster improved conditions in financial markets”
1
. Several studies analyze the effect 
of these purchases. Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) study various channels through which 
the purchases affected long term interest rates and find evidence of the existence of a 
prepayment risk premium channel and a default risk channel. Their prepayment risk 
premium channel is based on a previous study by Gabaix et al. (2007), who found that 
the premium required for prepayment risk depends on the total risk borne by mortgage 
investors. Since purchases of MBS represented a large fraction of the total market for 
MBS, they were able to change the marginal investor and thus reduce prepayment risk. 
Woodford (2012) questions the methodology used by Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), 
suggesting that the assumptions of, on one hand, market efficiency, needed to support 
an event-study approach, and of the existence of a segmented market, on the other hand, 
                                                 
1
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm accessed on November 2, 
2012 
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needed to sustain the prepayment risk premium channel, are not compatible, arguing 
that MBS purchases only affected its yields due to disruptions in financial markets.  
Stroebel et al. (2012) find little evidence of an impact of MBS purchases on yields. 
They estimate several regressions to quantify this impact and using the methodology 
that they considered more appropriate to account both for default and prepayment risk, 
MBS purchases caused a reduction of 8 bps in yields. The largest impact (-30 bps) is 
found when the effect on yields is assumed to be priced with the existence of the MBS 
purchase program, but, in this case, there is no evidence for a size effect of the program. 
Mishkin (2011) provides evidence that shocks in the financial sector compromise 
the ability to fund productive investment opportunities, leading to downturns in the 
economy and suggests that monetary policy was able to control the negative effect of 
the financial crisis on the business cycle, reducing the severity of the recession. 
III. Methodology 
I study two channels through which MBS purchases may have affected the 
economy. I argue that the Federal Reserve was (i) able to reduce MBS default risk 
premium by 66 bps (22% of the total reduction in MBS yields from November 2008 to 
November 2009) and (ii) lower the default risk of financial companies by 33 bps, while 
default probabilities increased 9 bps in the period analyzed. 
Following an event study approach, I study one day changes in the variables 
analyzed. The dates considered refer to the Federal Reserve’s initial announcement of 
its intent to purchase MBS, and subsequent FOMC statements
2
 where additional 
                                                 
2
 The dates analyzed are November 25, 2008; December 16, 2008; January 28, 2009; March 18, 2009; 
August 12, 2009; September 23, 2009 and November 4, 2009. These events are also considered in other 
studies (Krishnamurthy et al. study the first four dates and Gagnon et al. also include these dates on their 
baseline), which makes the results more comparable. I exclude the date of December 1
st
, 2008 (included 
in both studies) from the analysis, due to the fact that it was a Monday, which increases the window of 
analysis from one day to a weekend, and may introduce other events influencing the variables. 
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information concerning MBS purchases was provided. Even though this approach 
measures changes in expectations, measuring the actual impact in the economy is 
difficult because the economy experienced a great turbulence and even if the actions 
had a positive impact, it might not have been sufficiently large to offset other negative 
factors affecting the economy. Even so, I complement the analysis by considering larger 
time horizons. This is particularly important in assessing the impact of purchases in 
MBS prices. In fact, as Woodford (2012) refers, quantifying the impact of Federal 
Reserve measures as the cumulative movements in event days is consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis, but not with the thesis that purchases affected prices 
through an increase in demand, which should not occur in an efficient market. 
a. MBS pricing 
I analyze changes in factors that affect MBS pricing, in order to assess whether the 
purchases played a relevant role in yields on event dates. Using a multifactor model to 
estimate MBS yields, the required return on a MBS can be estimated as follows: 
                     
Where, 
   is the yield to maturity on a MBS. 
   is the risk free rate in the economy. 
   is the risk premium required for bearing the risk linked with    . 
   is a factor affecting MBS pricing. The risk on MBS arises from two sources: 
prepayment risk (  ) and default risk (  ). 
I expect MBS purchases to have a greater impact on longer term MBS, given that, 
until November 2009, 30 year MBS represented 96.8% of total MBS net purchases by 
the Federal Reserve. Therefore, I focus the analysis on these securities. I consider the 
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yields on MBS securities of each one of the three main issuers: Ginnie Mae, Freedie 
Mac and Fannie Mae and for each coupon
3
, I consider the average yield of the three. 
MBS pricing depends on prepayments, which reduce their value to investors, as they 
reduce the interest that investors expect to receive, and they may not be able to reinvest 
the principal at the same rate, especially because prepayments usually occur when 
interest rates are low. In fact, Schwartz and Torous (1989), found that mortgage values 
were very sensitive to prepayment assumptions. Regressing variation in MBS yields on 
constant prepayment rates
4
 (CPR), evidence on support of this was also found: MBS 
value falls when prepayment rates increase. I analyze changes in prepayments through 
Conventional MBS monthly Prepayment Commentaries from Bloomberg Mortgage 
Market Insight. Given that for prepayment risk to affect MBS yields on a specific date 
what matters are surprise changes, I assess whether those changes occurred on the event 
dates. I analyze each month separately and when prepayments are higher than the ones 
predicted by analysts, I expect yields to rise on that month, due to prepayment risk; and 
vice versa. This channel has two possible ways of affecting prices, in particular: 
 Decreasing risk premiums: risk premiums may have increased beyond their normal 
levels, due to the financial crisis. Federal Reserve announcements, by reducing 
concerns over the MBS market, may have decreased the risk premiums back to their 
normal levels. This effect is compatible with the efficient market hypothesis and 
therefore expected to be priced in the event days. 
 Demand side effects: MBS purchases were designed to be large relative to the size 
of the market. This can lead to a price effect that can be explained through a 
                                                 
3
 The MBS are the ones purchased by the Fed: 30 year MBS with coupons of 4.5; 5; 5.5; 6 and 6.5 (this 
sample includes almost all coupons purchased by the Fed until March 2009, except the 4 coupon 30 year 
MBS, to which data on Bloomberg was only available starting on the mid of December, 2008). 
4
 MBS yields and CPR are from Bloomberg. 
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marginal pricing approach, as the marginal investor in the MBS market will 
expectedly change as the purchases are made. Gabaix et al. (2007) find that the 
prepayment risk premium on MBS depends on the quantity of risk held by investors 
and Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) suggest that MBS purchases reduced the 
prepayment risk held by investors and thus reduced the required risk premium. 
These effects may only be totally priced as the MBS are actually purchased, as they 
result from an increase in demand and should not occur in an efficient market. 
Therefore, and acknowledging that other factors may have affected MBS yields, I 
also analyze changes in yields over the entire period.  
Default risk for Agency MBS results from the combination of defaults on 
underlying mortgages and the issuers not being able to fulfill their obligations (Stroebel 
et al., 2012). To measure default risk I adopt the measures suggested in Stroebel et al. 
(2012): the spreads between Fannie Mae bonds and U.S. Treasury securities and 
between Fannie Mae subordinated debt and U.S. Treasury securities
5
. Even though they 
suggest that using bonds to measure default risk may not be accurate, due to the Federal 
Reserve commitment to buy Agency bonds; I only found a statistically significant 
relationship between the spreads and MBS yields when using bonds. Furthermore, if I 
use 2009 data to estimate the impact of default risk on yields, the coefficients achieved 
using subordinated debt have signals contrary to the ones that would be expected. 
Therefore, I use both spreads to measure default risk changes and take into account that 
using bonds may overestimate decreases in default risk, as the purchases of Agency 
debt may reduce their yields. In my analysis, I consider the values of default risk impact 
                                                 
5
 In particular, I consider, U.S Treasury bonds with 5 years to maturity (Bloomberg ticker: USGG5YR 
Index) and Fannie Mae subordinated debt maturing in 2013 (Bloomberg ticker: FNMA 4.625 10/01/2013 
Corp and FNMA 4.625 10/09/2013 Corp). The spread between 5 year Fannie Mae bonds and U.S. 
Treasury securities is the FNMGVN5 Index. 
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on yields achieved using bonds more accurate, but in order to compare variations 
among event dates I use the values achieved with subordinated debt (see Table 3, in 
Appendix for the outputs of the regressions). 
b. Default risk channel 
Prior to the subprime crisis, the MBS market was one that represented an important 
income source for many of the companies which ignited the financial crisis: companies 
supported increasingly riskier loans, in order to increase their profits, introducing a 
great amount of risk into mortgage markets. In 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis 
irrupted, which was one of the factors leading to the financial crisis and contributing to 
the collapse of many companies. 
On the FOMC statement announcing the purchases of MBS, one of the stated 
objectives of the program was to “foster improved conditions in financial markets”
6
. 
The poor quality of some MBS issued and held by financial companies, which were 
deteriorating in value, was increasing concerns over the asset value of some financial 
companies. By purchasing MBS, the Federal Reserve might have been able to restore 
the confidence on financial markets: removing these assets from the investors’ Balance 
Sheet and increasing the value of the MBS remaining on the asset side of companies. 
Therefore, the default risk channel will be relevant if the purchases were able to 
decrease default probabilities, and thus facilitate the return to a more functional market. 
I estimate the direct impact of Quantitative Easing on financial markets, by measuring 
default risk of companies operating in this sector. The companies being analyzed are all 
the companies operating in the financial sector that are included in the S&P1500 index 
for which information is available concerning credit ratings, prices and value of 
                                                 
6
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm accessed on November 2, 
2012 
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liabilities
7
. The sample has a total of 134 companies. In the analysis, variations in 
probabilities of default are divided by the credit ratings of the companies. If the credit 
rating of a company changed during the months in study, the relevant credit rating is the 
one prevailing in the end of November 2009. Using panel data analysis, with the daily 
logarithms of the market capitalization of each financial firm, I also analyze the 
movements in the value of firms on event dates. 
By restoring the confidence on financial markets, MBS purchases may have reduced 
the severity of the contraction. To test this, I complement the analysis studying 
variations in default risk of a broader set of companies. The companies analyzed are the 
ones in the S&P500 index that operate in sectors of the economy which I estimate to 
have greater sensitivities to market moves, measured by the beta. In particular the 
sectors considered are: information technology (β=1.25), materials (β=1.19) and energy 
(β=1.11). The sample has a total of 81 companies. 
i. Measuring changes in default risk 
The probability of default of each company is estimated assuming that returns of the 
asset value of the firm follow a normal distribution with    ̂  and       . A firm 
will default if the growth rate of its assets is smaller than the relative distance that the 
asset value of the firm is from its default point. This model is similar to the one used by 
Moody’s KMV Company in its estimates of default probability (Crosbie et al., 2003). 
The probability of default can then be estimated through the following expression: 
     (   
     
  
)     
Where, 
                                                 
7
 Credit ratings are S&P Long Term Credit Ratings from Compustat and were accessed through Wharton 
Research Data Services. All other data is from Bloomberg. 
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   is the probability of default of a given company; 
     is the cumulative normal distribution function; 
   is the actual return of the asset value at time T; 
   is the asset value of the firm at time 0, which I assume to be equal to the sum of the 
market capitalization and the book value of debt; 
   are the liabilities payable at time T, known at time 0. 
If we standardize the previous expression, the probability of default will be: 
     (  
     
  
       
 ̂  √ 
)     
Where, 
 ̂  is the estimated volatility of the asset value of the firm, computed using five years of 
monthly data on stock prices; 
  is the time interval considered; 
     is the expected return. 
Assuming normality of the returns of a given company may not be very accurate. In 
fact, even though returns of large portfolios may present a distribution close to normal, 
the same does not apply for individual stocks. Another problem lies on the positive 
probabilities that get assigned to negative asset prices. Nonetheless, normality of returns 
is compatible with modern portfolio theory and is commonly used (for instance, the 
Black-Scholes model, used to price derivatives, assumes normality of the returns). 
1. Time horizon 
a. Short term default probability (1 year, 12 months) 
As most financial companies did not have data on their current liabilities available, 
the short term default point is estimated as a ratio of total liabilities. In particular, I 
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consider two ratios: ¼ and ½. The bigger ratio is used to account for the fact that many 
companies operating in the financial sector were being financed with short term 
maturity instruments, which might have been difficult to refinance. On the short term, I 
assume that the asset value of the firm is not expected to grow. Therefore,        . 
b. Long term default probability (3 years, 36 months) 
I assume long term liabilities to be half of the value of total liabilities. The       is 
estimated using the CAPM, the risk free rate of the economy (3 month U.S. government 
bill
8
), the beta of the company, estimated with 5 years of monthly data, and the market 
premium, based on Fama and French (2002) estimates. The       is given by: 
                                
ii. The yield curve as a leading indicator 
The impact of Federal Reserve measures in the business cycle is also assessed 
following a model proposed by Estrella and Turbin (2006), who argue that the yield 
curve has a predictive power in what concerns future economic activity and propose the 
following equation to measure the probability of a recession 12 months ahead: 
                                             
Where, 
     is the cumulative normal distribution function; 
  and   are parameters of the regression. Estimates are available at the New York 
Federal Reserve website
9
 and are equal to -0.53 and -0.63, respectively; 
      is the spread between the 10 year T-bond and 3 month T-bill rates; 
We have to take into account that long-term interest rates on treasuries may have 
been affected by MBS purchases. Even though most of the MBS purchased had 
                                                 
8
 Source: Bloomberg (Ticker: USGG3M Index) 
9
 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/Prob_Rec.pdf (accessed on November 2, 2012) 
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maturities of 30 years, while the long term rate considered has a maturity of 10 years, 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) suggest that duration of 30 year MBS is around 7 years. 
They argue that by reducing the market of long-term assets available to investors, MBS 
purchases may make some investors turn to other long-term assets, driving their prices 
up and lowering their yields, which might affect the estimates of the probability of a 
recession using the yield curve. However, given that this effect results from a decrease 
in the market for long term assets, it should only be priced as the purchases are actually 
made and not on event dates. 
Given that the Federal Reserve announced on March its intention to purchase longer 
term Treasury Securities, I will only use this measure until the January event date. 
IV. Impact of MBS purchases 
a. MBS pricing 
i. Prepayment risk changes10 
November: Even though prepayment rates fell, these changes were already projected to 
occur, and no surprise factor is present. However, 30 year 5s registered smaller 
prepayment rates than what analysts predicted, which may have contributed to decrease 
their yields. Therefore, changes in these MBS are not considered in November analysis. 
Even so yields fell in all the coupons analyzed with an average decrease of 39 bps. 
December: During this month, 30 year 6.5s prepayments remained unchanged or 
declined, due to difficulties in refinancing. Therefore, reductions in yields for these 
MBS may not be driven by lower risk premiums. Decreases on other MBS yields cannot 
be explained by lower prepayment expectations, given that prepayments increased 
during this month, as they were predicted to. However, analysts may have changed their 
                                                 
10
 Changes in yields without incorporating this analysis can be seen in Table 4, in Appendix. 
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models
11
, to account for greater difficulties in refinancing mortgages and the consequent 
decrease in prepayment rates. This led estimates of 1 month CPR to fall for all coupons. 
However, changes in models do not seem to be playing a major role in the date 
analyzed, given that decreases in yields of higher coupon bonds, which suffered greater 
decreases in prepayment rates, are smaller than for other MBS. If I exclude MBS with 
6.5 coupons from the analysis, yields fell on average 23 bps on 30 year MBS. 
January: Prepayment rates increased significantly during January and were projected to 
increase further in the following month. In particular, unexpected significant increases 
in prepayments of newly originated mortgages may have contributed to an increase in 
yields. The combination of these factors may have counterbalanced the effect of 
reductions in risk premiums. The smaller increase in yields of 6.5 30 year MBS 
suggests that prepayment risk was the major source of variation on this date, given that 
higher coupon MBS were experiencing greater difficulties in refinancing and 
consequently lower prepayment rates. Thus, I exclude this date from the analysis. 
March: Even though yields on all coupons fell, lower risk premiums cannot explain all 
declines: lower yields on 4.5 MBS may reflect the decline in prepayment rates of these 
bonds, when they were expected to increase. For other maturities, the decline in yields 
cannot be explained by changes in prepayment risk, which decreased less than 
anticipated by analysts during this month (it was expected to decrease 20-25% and 
decreased 1-2%). Hence, the decrease in MBS yields with coupons greater than 4.5 was 
driven by factors other than prepayment risk, leading to a decrease of 23 bps. 
August: During this month, prepayment rates fell more than analysts had predicted. If 
this decrease was affecting MBS yields on the event dates, yields would have fallen, 
                                                 
11
 Bloomberg, for instance announced on December 11, 2008 that it would update its prepayment model, 
to account for significant changes in refinancing behavior. 
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especially for lower coupon bonds. However, as yields increased for almost all MBS, 
prepayment risk factors do not seem to have played an important role on this event date. 
MBS yields increased on average by 3 bps. 
September: Yields on all coupons fell slightly, except for MBS with 6.5 coupons, which 
increased 7 bps. Given that prepayment rates for lower coupon bonds decreased more 
than what analysts expected, prepayment risk changes may have affected yields on the 
day considered. Therefore, I do not include the September event date on the analysis. 
October
12
: Prepayment rates increased and were predicted to continue to rise. On the 
event date, yields decreased, suggesting that other factors influenced MBS yields. Even 
so, the variation in yields is very small, with yields decreasing on average by 1 bps. 
Over the entire period 
Between November 2008 and March 2009, yields on 30 year MBS fell by 209 bps. 
If I exclude from the analysis 30 year MBS with 6.5 coupons, which prepayment risk 
decreased, due to greater difficulties in refinancing these type of mortgages and which 
purchases in November 2009 only represented 0.3% of total 30 year MBS net purchases 
by the Federal Reserve; 30 year MBS yields fell, on average, 229 bps. It is important to 
refer that this effect cannot be explained by lower prepayments, since prepayment rates 
actually increased between November 2008 and March 2009: CPR for 5s, 5.5s and 6s 
30 year FNMA mortgages increased from 3.4%, 4.2% and 6.1% to 18.3%, 26.5% and 
26.2%, respectively. Furthermore, higher coupon MBS yields fell less than those of 
lower coupon, which is consistent with the greater proportion of MBS with lower yields 
purchased by the Federal Reserve during this period (4, 4.5 and 5 MBS represented 
81.4% of the net purchases of 30 year MBS by the Federal Reserve until March). 
                                                 
12
 The November FOMC statement occurs on the beginning of the month, and therefore I assume that 
information from November was not yet available to be priced on MBS by then. 
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The effect of the Federal Reserve posterior announcements on yields was minor, 
with variations in yields not exceeding 3 bps on event dates. Even though yields still fell 
71 bps further until November 2009, this decrease may have been driven by lower 
prepayment rates: in fact, CPR for 5s 30 year FNMA mortgages decreased to 14% 
(relative to 18.3% in March 2009). 
ii. Default risk changes 
Default risk decreased on most of the event dates considered, which may have also 
contributed to lower MBS yields. The estimated regressions on the impact of default 
risk variations on the variation of MBS present, however, very small  , suggesting that 
variations in default risk alone are not able to explain variations in yields (see Table 3, 
in Appendix). I adopt as measures of default risk the spread estimated using Fannie Mae 
bonds and the subordinated debt maturing on October 1, 2013, which presents a lower 
p-value than the regression estimated using the other subordinated debt. Based on the 
estimated regression, variations in MBS driven by default risk changes can be 
estimated, and the results are shown in the following section. 
iii. Impact on MBS pricing 
Table 1 summarizes the variation in MBS yields after accounting for the effect of 
prepayment and default risk changes. The second column incorporates the analysis on 
prepayment risk, showing the variation in MBS yields that were not influenced by 
prepayment risk variations, based on the analysis developed previously. The following 
two columns show the variations in default risk, measured as the spread of Fannie Mae 
corporate bonds and subordinated debt, respectively, with U.S. Government securities. 
The last two columns present the variations in yields after removing the effect of default 
risk changes, based on the equation estimated in Table 3, in Appendix.  
17 
 
Table 1: Variation in MBS yields on event dates 
Event dates MBS 
Default risk 
(bond) 
Default risk 
(subordinated debt) 
MBS change 
(bond) 
MBS change 
(subordinated debt) 
25-11-2008 -0,39 -0,35 -0,40 -0,24 -0,34 
16-12-2008 -0,23 -0,03 -0,13 -0,22 -0,21 
18-03-2009 -0,23 -0,04 0,14 -0,21 -0,24 
12-08-2009 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,03 
04-11-2009 -0,01 0,03 -0,01 -0,02 -0,01 
Cumulative -0,82 -0,38 -0,40 -0,66 -0,77 
Until March -2,29 -0,48 -0,84 -2,08 -2,18 
Entire period -2,99 -1,11 -1,74 -2,51 -2,78 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
Quantitative Easing was able to reduce MBS yields by 66 bps. This impact accounts 
for 22% of the variation in MBS yields during this period. The greatest decreases in 
MBS yields occurred on the first announcement days. Given that the subprime crisis 
that affected MBS was driven by loans with high risk of default, I believe that the 
default risk premium was the one decreasing the most on event dates. The prepayment 
risk premium channel, which, according to Gabaix et al (2007), depends on the total risk 
held by investors in MBS, is harder to quantify. By looking at Table 1, the decrease in 
MBS that cannot be explained by the default risk premium channel is of 85 bps and 
other factors may have affected MBS during this period. However, it has to be taken 
into consideration that prepayment risk actually increased in the period in analysis, 
especially until March 2009, and lower prepayment risk premiums might have 
contributed to counterbalance its effect on yields.  
I confirm Stroebel et al. (2012) proposition that a decrease in default risk affected 
MBS yields. However, not all the decrease can be explained by lower default risk: even 
after accounting for the impact of default risk, yields still fell on event dates. The 
estimate of a 66 bps decrease in yields is above their 8 bps and 30 bps estimates. 
Evidence in support of the importance of the size of the purchases is also found. In fact, 
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the major decreases in MBS yields occurred when the Federal Reserve announced the 
MBS purchase program and when it increased the planned purchases. On the event 
dates following March only minor changes occurred on yields, which can be explained 
by the inexistence of changes on the quantity of planned MBS purchases. 
Relative to Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), I add the effect of variations in default risk 
on MBS yields and suggest that default risk premium channel was the one affecting 
MBS yields on event dates, rather than the prepayment risk premium channel. Even 
though a prepayment risk premium channel can also have occurred, the actual impact of 
that channel is harder to quantify, because it should only be totally priced as the actual 
purchases are made. Furthermore, their estimates of MBS yields variations on event 
dates are greater than the values I found: considering the same event dates MBS yields 
fell by 125 bps, which is higher than the 94 bps decrease estimated here. This difference 
might be driven in part by different coupons of MBS considered in the samples.  
b. Default risk channel 
i. Default risk companies 
By looking at Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 (in Appendix), which present variations 
in the default probabilities of companies operating in the financial sector , divided by 
their credit ratings, we can observe that MBS purchases were able to reduce their 
default risk, with the greatest reductions occurring until March 2009. The decrease was 
greater for lower rated companies, which is consistent with a recovery of the confidence 
in the financial sector hypothesis – companies that were worse to begin with, suffered 
more from the loss of confidence in this sector. The fact that most of the decrease 
occurs until March is also suggestive of the importance of the MBS purchases, given 
that during this period default probabilities actually increased by 59 bps. 
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Companies with lower ratings were the ones experiencing the major decreases on 
default probabilities, which fell 41 bps on a three year horizon. The decreases become 
smaller as the ratings increase. Over one year the default probabilities do not change 
significantly, with the cumulative decreases not exceeding 7 bps. However, accounting 
for the large amount of short term funding that some companies relied upon, increases 
the impact of Quantitative Easing on the short term default risk in 15 bps and in 25 bps 
for lower rated companies, that see their default probabilities falling by 32 bps. 
The decrease in default probabilities on event days was not present over the entire 
period, when default probabilities actually increased. This suggests that MBS purchases 
were able to contain part of the loss of confidence in the financial sector, even though 
not totally countering it. We also have to take into consideration that probabilities of 
default of some companies may have increased due to fundamental reasons. 
By looking at Figure 1, we can observe that default probabilities had been increasing 
since the beginning of 2008, with an acceleration in the rate of increase starting on 
September 2008 (first vertical line). When the Federal Reserve announced its intention 
to purchase MBS (second vertical line), probabilities of default decreased and kept 
decreasing until January, falling 34 bps. Default probabilities then increased and the 
January FOMC statement (fourth vertical line) was not able to contain this increase. The 
fifth vertical line indicates the FOMC statement in which the Federal Reserve 
announced its intention to increase the quantity of MBS purchased. From there 
onwards, default probabilities kept decreasing until the rest of the year. Even though 
Quantitative Easing cannot explain all the decreases in default probabilities, because 
other policies were taken during this period, it may have played an important role on the 
long term stabilization of default probabilities in the financial sector. 
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Figure 1: Average 3 year default probabilities 
 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
Quantitative Easing was able to contain the effect of the financial crisis on the rest 
of the economy, with default risks of companies with high systemic risk falling on all 
event dates (see Table 8, in Appendix). These findings are aligned with Krishnamurthy 
et al. (2011), who show that default risk and default risk premia decreased and that the 
decreases were greater for lower rated companies. However, they do not study the 
specific impact on the financial sector, where MBS purchases are expected to have a 
direct impact. 
Using panel data analysis (see Table 9, in Appendix, for the outputs of the 
regression), I find statistically significant increases of 4.2% in the value of firms on 
event dates, while the coefficient for the other dates reflects a negative trend in the 
market capitalization of firms, which falls on average 0.1%. The impact of the 
announcements increases if I consider the event dates until March 2009, with the market 
value of firms increasing by approximately 7.8% in each event date, suggesting that 
most of the effect on financial markets of MBS purchases were priced until March. 
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Given that starting on March no increases in the quantity of MBS purchased by the 
Federal Reserve were announced, this finding seems aligned with market efficiency. 
ii. Probability of a recession 
Table 2: Changes in the probability of a recession 
 1 day change 2 day change 
25-11-2008 0,31% 0,41% 
16-12-2008 0,73% 1,11% 
28-01-2009 -0,27% -0,64% 
Cumulative 0,77% 0,88% 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
The probability of a recession increased in the first two event dates. This increase 
does not appear to be related with fluctuations in the trading of government bonds, as 2 
day changes confirm the evidence found through the one day window. One possible 
interpretation for the contradicting results obtained by studying the yield curve and the 
default risk of companies can be that, even though the length of the recession may have 
increased – measured by the probability of a recession in one year –, the severity of the 
recession decreased, with default probabilities falling in the event dates analyzed. 
V. Conclusions 
Quantitative Easing, through large-scale MBS purchases, was able to improve 
confidence in financial markets and to lower the default risk premium on MBS. Most of 
this impact seems to occur until March 2009. 
The impact on default risk was estimated through a model for the default probability 
of a company, assuming that returns follow a normal distribution. The largest impact 
occurred for default probabilities over a three year horizon, which decreased 41 bps for 
companies with lower ratings. Accounting for refinancing constraints and the fact that 
many companies operating in the financial sector financed themselves with short term 
funding, increases the impact of MBS purchases on one year default probabilities in 15 
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bps. These estimates are likely to undervalue the true impact of Quantitative Easing on 
the default risk, as the model used does not account for covariance between default 
probabilities. The importance of MBS purchases on default risk of financial companies 
becomes even more patent when observing that default probabilities increased during 
the period analyzed. Until March, when most of the impact on default risk occurs, 
default risk increased 59 bps, while on event dates it decreased 37 bps. 
To estimate the impact of purchases on MBS pricing, I analyze variations in CPR to 
assess whether they were affecting yields on event dates and quantify, through a 
regression, the variance in yields attributable to default risk. I find that purchases were 
able to reduce MBS yields in 11.2 bps. Because disturbances on mortgage markets were 
caused by high risk lending, I attribute this reduction to a lower default risk premium. 
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Appendixes 
Table 3: Regression on the relationship between measures on default risk and MBS yields 
                                                          
 
09/10/2013 01/10/2013 
09/10/2013 
(2008) 
01/10/2013 
(2008) 
Index 
   
-0,0005 
(0,0011) 
-0,0003 
(0,0011) 
0,0655 
(0,1802) 
0,123 
(0,1758) 
0,43*** 
(0,1184) 
*** indicates significance at the 1% significance level; the date indicates the maturity of the subordinated debt 
considered as measure of default risk 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
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Table 4: Variations in MBS yields on event dates 
Coupons 4,5 5 5,5 6 6,5 Average 
25-11-2008 -0,93 -0,46 -0,31 -0,19 -0,13 -0,40 
16-12-2008 -0,38 -0,24 -0,17 -0,12 -0,11 -0,20 
18-03-2009 -0,39 -0,30 -0,23 -0,15 -0,12 -0,24 
12-08-2009 0,03 0,01 0,07 0,00 0,02 0,03 
23-09-2009 -0,01 -0,02 -0,03 -0,01 0,07 0,00 
04-11-2009 0,01 0,00 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 
Cumulative -1,67 -1,00 -0,68 -0,48 -0,28 -0,82 
Period until March -3,24 -2,48 -1,94 -1,48 -1,32 -2,29 
Over the entire period -3,40 -2,97 -3,00 -2,59 -2,39 -2,99 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
Table 5: Default risk variations on event days (3 year default probabilities) (Companies operating in the 
financial sector) 
 As BBB+ BBB BBB- BB/CCC Bs/Cs All 
25-11-2008 -0,07% -0,06% -0,11% -0,09% -0,07% -0,08% -0,08% 
16-12-2008 -0,08% -0,13% -0,13% -0,15% -0,15% -0,14% -0,12% 
28-01-2009 -0,11% -0,11% -0,13% -0,14% -0,15% -0,13% -0,12% 
18-03-2009 -0,05% -0,05% -0,05% -0,04% -0,07% -0,05% -0,05% 
12-08-2009 -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% -0.02% -0.02% 
23-09-2009 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 
04-11-2009 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 
Cumulative -0,28% -0,32% -0,37% -0,38% -0,41% -0,36% -0,33% 
Period until March 0,41% 0,61% 0,62% 0,68% 0,91% 0,67% 0,59% 
Over the entire period 0.12% 0.19% -0.01% 0.10% 0.00% 0.07% 0.09% 
Source: Bloomberg, Compustat and own calculations 
Table 6: Default risk variations on event dates (1 year default probabilities) (Companies operating in the 
financial sector) (d=1/4 total liabilities) 
 As BBB+ BBB BBB- BB/CCC Bs/Cs All 
25-11-2008 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
16-12-2008 -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,02% -0,03% -0,01% -0,01% 
28-01-2009 -0,01% 0,00% -0,01% -0,01% -0,02% -0,01% -0,01% 
18-03-2009 -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,02% -0,01% -0,01% 
12-08-2009 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
23-09-2009 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
04-11-2009 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cumulative -0,02% 0.00% -0,03% -0,04% -0,07% -0,03% -0,03% 
Period until March 0,01% 0,02% 0,03% 0,06% 0,14% 0,05% 0,04% 
Over the entire period -0.02% -0.04% -0.04% 0.01% -0.08% -0.04% -0.03% 
Source: Bloomberg, Compustat and own calculations 
  
25 
 
Table 7: Default risk variations on event dates (1 year default probabilities) (Companies operating in the 
financial sector) (d=1/2 total liabilities) 
 As BBB+ BBB BBB- BB/CCC Bs/CCC All 
25-11-2008 -0,01% 0,00% -0,04% -0,02% -0,01% -0,02% -0,02% 
16-12-2008 -0,05% -0,07% -0,08% -0,09% -0,13% -0,09% -0,08% 
28-01-2009 -0,05% -0,03% -0,06% -0,07% -0,11% -0,06% -0,06% 
18-03-2009 -0,04% -0,04% -0,04% -0,04% -0,09% -0,05% -0,05% 
12-08-2009 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.03% -0.02% -0.01% 
23-09-2009 0.01% 0.13% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 
04-11-2009 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
Cumulative -0,14% -0,02% -0,21% -0,21% -0,32% -0,20% -0,18% 
Period until March 0,15% 0,23% 0,29% 0,30% 0,71% 0,33% 0,27% 
Over the entire period -0.09% -0.13% -0.18% -0.02% -0.31% -0.15% -0.13% 
Source: Bloomberg, Compustat and own calculations 
Table 8: Default risk variations on event dates (3 year default probabilities) (Companies operating in sectors 
with high systemic risk) 
 
Source: Bloomberg, Compustat and own calculations 
Table 9: Regression on the first differences of market capitalization of financial firms 
                                                            
Where,      in the event dates. 
 
Until March All event dates 
Constant 
-0,0015*** 
(0,0002) 
-0,0014*** 
(0,002) 
Event date 
0,0784***  
(0,0024) 
0,0423*** 
(0,0019) 
*** indicates significance at the 1% significance level 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
 
3 year  As Bs BB/B All 
25-11-2008 -0,04% -0,10% -0,11% -0,08% 
16-12-2008 -0,06% -0,17% -0,17% -0,12% 
28-01-2009 -0,09% -0,16% -0,21% -0,13% 
18-03-2009 -0,02% -0,06% -0,09% -0,04% 
12-08-2009 -0.02% -0.04% -0.06% -0.03% 
23-09-2009 0.01% 0.04% 0.05% 0.03% 
04-11-2009 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 
Cumulative -0,22% -0,50% -0,60% -0,38% 
Period until March 0,13% 0,13% 0,26% 0,13% 
Over the entire period -0.37% -1.09% -1.48% -0.80% 
